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The chapter by Severin Borenstein discusses how market-based approaches might have to be 
adjusted for human activities that impact the carbon flux differently across locations.  The 
question is whether geographic variations in the carbon flux are large enough and measureable 
enough to usefully employ a spatially varied carbon-pricing scheme.  Experience with markets 
for sulfur-dioxide emissions indicates that a pollution pricing mechanisms can greatly enhance 
efficiency, even if they do not perfectly account for geographic differences in the marginal costs 
and benefits of emissions. 
 
Market-based Regulation 
The main appeal of market-based regulations (taxes or permits) is that they minimize abatement 
cost for a given reduction of pollution.  Sulfur-dioxide (SO2) emissions were subject a permit 
trading system in the United States in the 1990s.  Stavins (1998) argues that it resulted in annual 
cost savings of more than $1 billion as firms with lowest abatement cost reduced SO2 emissions.  
It is celebrated as a big success story and has become a benchmark for modern environmental 
policy. 
A tax or permit system can lead to suboptimal outcomes if it interacts with other 
distortions or a unit of pollution causes damages that depend on where it is emitted.  For 
example, under the NOx budget program, regulated or publicly owned utilities were more likely 
to install costly capital equipment (Fowlie, 2010).  These capital investments generated excess 
permits which could be sold to firms in deregulated and restructured electricity markets.  Since 
NOx is a local pollutant, it matters where a unit is emitted.  As it turns out, deregulated markets 
are dirtier to begin with.  Permit trading therefore shifted pollution towards areas where a unit of 
pollution is more damaging.   
Market-based regulations have the potential to increase pollution damages if the location 
of the emission matters (a non-uniformly mixing pollutant).  In such a case the tax rate would 
have to differ between locations, or permits would no longer be traded one for one.  Instead, 
differentiated tax and trading ratios incorporate that marginal damages vary between regions.   
While CO2 perfectly mixes in the atmosphere, Borenstein emphasizes that a policy that 
reduces greenhouse emissions in one area might increase it in another area. 
 
The Carbon Cycle 
Anthropogenic emissions are a small part of the annual carbon cycle.  Humans account for 
carbon emissions of roughly 9GtC compared to a “natural” carbon flux of 210GtC.  About half 
of anthropogenic emissions stay in the atmosphere while the other half gets absorbed by oceans, 
vegetation, and soils.  Each GtC of anthropogenic emissions therefore increases global CO2 
levels by roughly 2.25ppm (parts per million).   
Is this amount of anthropogenic emissions large?  CO2 levels have fluctuated in the past.  
Reconstructions for the last 400,000 years by Hansen et al. (2008) show that CO2 concentrations fluctuated between 200ppm and 300ppm, or roughly 40 years worth of current emissions 
(holding current absorption rates constant).  Reconstructed temperature records in the Arctic 
changed in phase by up to 10C.  Higher latitudes show larger fluctuations in warming than the 
global average, and the authors estimate that a doubling of CO2 concentrations would result in a 
+3C increase in temperature accounting only for fast feedback processes, and +6C when slow 
feedback processes are also included.  Different models give various estimates of the climate 
sensitivity as there are large numbers of unresolved uncertainties. 
There are at least several layers of uncertainty related to aggregate CO2 emissions:  (i) 
will sinks continue to absorb CO2 or will they slow down in the future; (ii) how do changes in 
greenhouse gas concentrations translate into changes in the global temperature; and (iii) what are 
the feedback loops between a warming world and greenhouse gases releases, e.g., will there be 
an extra release of methane when permafrost soils thaw?  What is common to all these sources of 
uncertainty is that they relate to aggregate emissions.  If the goal is to minimize compliance cost, 
a uniform tax rate around the world or a permit system where all countries participate would 
yield the optimal result.  As uncertainty resolves, the regulating agency could adjust the tax rate 
or number of emissions permits.  Several US regulations require periodic reauthorization, at 
which point these optimal levels could be revised.
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Another area with deep uncertainty depends on local anthropogenic interactions with the 
carbon cycle.  Since the natural carbon flux is more than 20 times as large as anthropogenic 
emissions, even small local feedback loops with the natural carbon flux can in principle be an 
important component of anthropogenic emissions.  Two examples can illustrate this point 
Agricultural policies can both directly impact the carbon flux (tilling releases carbon, and 
the use of fertilizer can release greenhouse gases) and indirectly as supply responses to changing 
prices occur predominantly on the extensive margin (Roberts and Schlenker, 2010).  If newly 
cultivated land comes from deforestation, large amounts of greenhouse gases can be released as 
20% of carbon emissions are related to land use change.  If, on the other hand, fallow land is 
brought back into production, the land expansion might be a carbon sink.  It crucially depends on 
where the expansion takes place. 
Pollution control policies also affect plant growth and soil practices.  Auffhammer et al. 
(2006) show that climate change due to brown clouds (air pollution) and greenhouse gases 
contributed to the slowdown in Indian harvest growth rates.  A reduction in harvest growth again 
impacts world food prices and leads to expansions elsewhere.  These local interactions have the 
potential to impact the carbon flux, and are not incorporated in current policy proposals. 
Local feedback effects would require locally differentiated taxes or permit trading ratios.  
Incorporating local differences would increase economic efficiency.  At the same time, the 
countries of the world have a difficult time agreeing to an overall limit, agreeing on local 
feedback loops might proof even more daunting: every country will have an incentive to argue 
that it is subject to a feedback loop that reduces the carbon flux to the atmosphere.  In doing so it 
would obtain a more advantageous trading ratio.   
                                                 
1 Weitzman (1974) demonstrates that the expected deadweight loss can vary under a tax or permit system when 
there is uncertainty about the marginal abatement cost curve.  The optimal choice depends on the slopes of the 
marginal damage and marginal abatement cost curves. Conclusions 
There is considerable uncertainty about all the feedback effects between rising greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere and changes in climate.  Uncertainties related to aggregate 
emissions are easier to incorporate in a market-based system of taxes or permits as regulators 
only have to adjust the overall tax rate or pollution cap as more information becomes available. 
On the other hand, local feedback effects would require location-specific taxes or permit trading 
systems.  Once uncertainties are resolved, the entire set of bilateral coefficients would have to be 
revised, which directly impact the cost of the regulation in each region.  Individual countries 
have a strong incentive to play up feedback loops that reduce the carbon flux into the atmosphere 
while ignoring feedback loops that reduce the carbon flux.  The potential gains from non-
uniform regulations should be weighed against the possible implications they have for additional 
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